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Abstract: This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to
dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities
class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases
filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2001. These circuits are the
leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as
representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second
Circuit applies the least restrictive pleading standard to securities claims and the Ninth
Circuit applies the most restrictive.
The Ninth Circuit’s post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher venue in which to
win securities fraud class actions is born out by a significantly higher dismissal rate. The
differences between the two circuits are also reflected in factors that correlate with
dismissal. For example, allegations of violations of accounting principles other than
revenue recognition correlate negatively with dismissal in the Second Circuit. This
coefficient, however, is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. Allegations
of revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, whether or not the
issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The circuits part ways on other factors
as well: the Second Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss cases with allegations of
false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given the stringent standards for
such statements imposed by the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to
dismiss complaints with allegations of ’33 Act violations and the Second Circuit is more
likely to dismiss cases brought by the Milberg Weiss firm. When it comes to insider
trading, however, the two circuits are both skeptical and the allegations correlate with
dismissal in both circuits.
Keywords: Securities litigation, accounting fraud, insider trading.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
What counts as fraud in securities class actions? Who wins and who loses?

These questions are obviously important to the lawyers who specialize in this area, as
well as the corporate officers and directors whose firms are targeted by these suits. But
the questions are also important to Congress, the SEC, and other policymakers and
academics considering the deterrence and governance roles played by securities fraud
class actions.
To date, little rigorous empirical investigation has been brought to bear on these
questions. Most of the efforts to answer these questions analyze appellate court cases or
tally up numbers of lawsuits or settlement values. Although extrapolating from cases is
the traditional mode of legal scholarship and it can shed insights on many issues, it does
not provide a full picture of how litigation works on the ground.
The dearth of solid empirical work on securities fraud class actions did not chill
legislative initiatives in this area in the 1990’s.

Despite the lack of solid data on

securities fraud class actions, Congress decided that the field was ripe for reform. The
initial lobbying force behind the PSLRA was the accounting industry. Over time, hightech industry leaders, lawyers, and other frequent defendants of such class actions joined
forces with the accountants.1 The concern voiced most frequently by these interest
groups was that frivolous class action complaints were being filed largely for settlement
value.2 Reform proponents claimed that a simple drop in a company’s stock price would
result in the filing of a complaint that, in turn, would provide leverage for settlement

1

See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s
Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L. Q. 537, 555 (1998) (discussing
reform movement and participants).
2
See id. at 552-53.
2
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given the time and risk entailed in contesting such claims.3 Settlement pressure also
resulted from expensive discovery demands, and reform proponents argued that nonmeritorious cases were settled simply to avoid the costs of litigation.4
Although the evidence on these claims was mixed,5 Congress generally accepted
the arguments in adopting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”).6 The PSLRA erects a series of procedural barriers to securities fraud cases
intended to discourage meritless suits and reduce the cost of defending class actions.
President Clinton vetoed the legislation, expressing the view that it would deter
meritorious cases of fraud, but Congress overrode his veto.7
Congress’s enactment of the PSLRA is simply the first step in the effort to crack
down on abusive class actions. Judicial interpretation and application of the PSLRA’s
provisions will have much to do with how the law affects issuers and investors. The
process of interpretation is particularly important for the PSLRA because its cornerstone
provision was left purposefully vague by a Congress that could not reach agreement on a
more determinate formulation.8 Not surprisingly, that vagueness has led to divergent
interpretations of the PSLRA in the courts.9 Do those divergent interpretations lead to
different outcomes?
To answer that question, this paper examines how judges are implementing the
PSLRA’s barriers to suit. Specifically, we study the resolution of motions to dismiss
3

See id. at 553-54.
See id. at 553-54.
5
See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Dav. L.Rev. 903, n. __ (2000) (discussing and citing
articles debating arguments underlying the PSLRA).
6
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.).
7
See 141 Cong. Rec. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
8
See Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627 (2002) (describing tacit “agreement
to disagree” over the PSLRA’s pleading standard).
4
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under the PSLRA. The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event for corporate
issuers. Until the motion to dismiss is resolved, the PSLRA’s discovery stay prevents the
plaintiffs from obtaining discovery to flesh out the allegations of their complaint.10 Thus,
plaintiffs’ lawyers must construct their claims of fraud out of the issuer’s past filings with
the SEC and press release. Moreover, the absence of discovery means that the expense of
litigation will be manageable for the issuer. If the corporation fails to get the case
dismissed, however, it must suffer through an expensive and time-consuming airing of its
potentially dirty laundry through the discovery process. Worse yet, the corporation faces
the specter of potentially ruinous damages if the case goes to trial (particularly for those
cases that are strongest on the merits).

Aversion to that risk, and, of course, the

possibility that fraud actually occurred, ensure that securities fraud class actions rarely go
to a jury. Cases that are not dismissed on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment,
and that survive class certification, invariably settle. Understanding the determinants of
motions to dismiss, therefore, is a crucial piece in understanding how securities fraud
class actions operate in the real world.
We proceed as follows. Part 2 provides background on securities fraud class
actions and the objectives of the PSLRA.

Part 3 develops a series of hypotheses

regarding the determinants of outcomes of motions to dismiss in securities fraud class
actions. Part 4 presents the results of our empirical tests of those hypotheses. We find
that the law matters – the Ninth Circuit’s post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher
venue in which to win securities fraud class actions is born out by the data, which shows
a significantly higher dismissal rate in that circuit. Somewhat surprisingly, allegations of

9

See id. at _ (collecting cases).
Exchange Act §21D(b)(3)(B).
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revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, whether or not the issuer
has been forced to restate those revenues. The two circuits take a similar approach to
insider trading, which correlates with dismissal in both circuits. The two circuits part
ways, however, in their approach to other allegations commonly found in securities fraud
complaints. For example, allegations of violations of accounting principles other than
revenue recognition correlate negatively with dismissal in the Second Circuit, but this
coefficient is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit is
significantly less likely than the Ninth to dismiss cases with allegations of false forwardlooking statements, a surprising result given the stringent standards for such statements
imposed by the PSLRA. We conclude that plaintiffs’ lawyers are being more selective in
making such allegations, in contrast to less precisely targeted allegations tied to insider
trading. In addition, we find that the Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss
complaints with allegations of ’33 Act violations than the Second Circuit is. But, the
Second Circuit is more likely than the Ninth Circuit to dismiss cases brought by the
Milberg Weiss firm. Part 5 concludes.

II.

BACKGROUND
REFORM ACT

TO

THE

PRIVATE

SECURITIES

LITIGATION

The plaintiffs’ and defense bar (along with outside observers) agree that the
PSLRA makes it more difficult to plead a securities fraud complaint that can survive a
motion to dismiss.11 The PSLRA addressed these cases in various ways, including two
that we focus on here: heightened pleading standards for securities fraud complaints and
actual-knowledge standards for forward-looking statements.

11

Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securities Class Action: Federal
Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641 (1997).
5

What Counts as Fraud?

A.

The Pleading Standard
The main focus of our study is the effect of the heightened pleading standard.

Most securities fraud class actions allege that the defendants violated section 10(b)12 and
Rule 10b-513 of the Securities Exchange Act (“10b-5 claims”). In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court rejected a negligence standard for 10b-5 claims, instead
holding that plaintiffs alleging such claims must prove that the defendants acted with
scienter.14 Scienter requires that the defendant have acted at least recklessly in making
the misstatement. Thus, to state such a claim, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant
made a material misstatement or omission, with scienter, and that she was injured by her
reliance on that misstatement or omission.15
In their attempts to apply the scienter standard to complaints alleging 10b-5
claims, the circuits developed diverse pleading standards based on Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) departs from the general rule of notice
pleading16 by requiring that allegations of fraud be made “with particularity” but allowing
state of mind to be “averred generally.”17 The two circuits we study, the Second and the
Ninth, took very different approaches to the pleading standard. Consistent with the
language of Rule 9(b), before the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had developed a heightened
pleading standard allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter generally, but demanding
particularity in alleging all other elements of securities fraud.18
12

15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
14
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
15
Id. at 197.
16
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring that complaint provide only short and plain statement of claim).
17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
18
See In re Glenfed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
13
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By contrast, the Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead the state of mind with
particularity. Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit had held that plaintiffs could meet
the scienter standard in one of two ways. First, plaintiffs could plead that the defendants
had the motive to commit fraud and the opportunity to do so.19 Although simplistic
allegations of motive that could apply generally, such as keeping one’s job,20 were
insufficient to meet the standard, other allegations of specific financial gain from a
transaction were sufficient to state a claim.21 Second, plaintiffs could meet the standard
with circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or conscious behavior.22 Generally,
this standard required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous facts, conditions, or statements
to show that the defendants knew or should have known that the alleged misstatement
was misleading when made.23
In the PSLRA, Congress resolved this split by rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
approach and adopting a heightened pleading standard that drew on the Second Circuit’s
approach.24 The “strong inference” provision requires that:
In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.25

19

754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994).
21
See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that allegations that defendants
bullish statements to market were connected to significant stock sales met motive and opportunity test).
22
See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir.
1996) (requiring plaintiffs seeking to meet recklessness standard to provide higher level of detail than that
required under motive and opportunity test).
23
See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d. Cir. 1994) (rejecting allegations of fraud where
plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous internal document or data).
24
See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1993), reprinted in 1995-96 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
25
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746-47 (1995). Section 21D(b)(2).
20
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Although it is now clear that plaintiffs must plead scienter with particularity, it remains
unclear how much detail is required to meet that particularity standard. The legislative
history can be fairly read to require a standard equivalent to the then-existing Second
Circuit standard or, potentially, a higher standard still.26 The combination of confusing
legislative history and the fact-based nature of securities fraud claims has led to the
emergence of different pleading standards across the circuits.27
Consequently, courts have struggled to apply the heightened pleading standard to
various allegations of fraud. In this Article, we examine the effect of the PSLRAs
heightened pleading standard as applied to decisions resolving motions to dismiss by
courts within the Second and Ninth Circuits. We focus on these circuits for two reasons.
First, these two circuits far outpace the others in the number of securities fraud claims
litigated.28 Second, the two circuits have interpreted the pleading standard in divergent
ways, with the Ninth Circuit now recognized to have the most stringent pleading standard
in the country, and the Second Circuit believed to have the least stringent.29 These
differing standards may lead to differing treatment of similar types of allegations.30
26

See Sale, supra note __; Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __.
See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __, __.
28
See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __.
29
See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __.
30
A brief description of the conflicting standards may be useful to readers not familiar with this debate.
The Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and held that the PSLRA codified its pre-PSLRA
pleading approach. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, __ (2000). The Second Circuit has, however, refined
its explication of the standard post-PSLRA. Now, rather than a two-prong test, the Second Circuit has set
forth a list of the general types of allegations that will meet the heightened pleading standard for scienter.
Synthesizing its own case law on the pleading standard, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs can plead a
strong inference of fraudulent intent by including sufficient allegations that the defendants: received
concrete, personal benefits from the alleged fraud; participated in deliberately illegal behavior; knew or had
access to facts “suggesting” that the public statements were inaccurate; or “failed to check information they
had a duty to monitor.” See id. at . This refined standard, of course, still leaves room for pleading based on
motive and opportunity.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the PSLRA repudiated that court’s old standard,
which did not require that state of mind be pleaded with specificity. In interpreting the “strong inference”
provision, the court also relied on the PSLRA’s legislative history, but concluded that the statute raised the
standard above that of the Second Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974
27
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B.

The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
We also analyze the PSLRA provision creating a separate liability standard for

“forward-looking statements.”31

This standard grew out of the “bespeaks caution”

doctrine developed by the courts. Under this doctrine, courts would not hold defendants
liable for financial projections and other forward-looking statements if those statements
were accompanied by cautionary language to warn investors that the predictions might
not bear out. If the warnings were sufficiently tailored, courts applying the “bespeaks
caution” standard concluded that the forward-looking statements were immaterial, and
thus, not actionable, even if false.32
In the PSLRA, Congress created a liability standard for forward-looking
statements even more restrictive than the heightened pleading standard discussed above.
These statements are protected by a safe harbor. To circumvent that safe harbor, the
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendants making the statements did so with
actual knowledge of their falsity.33 Even if the plaintiff can plead actual knowledge, the
safe harbor still bars the claim if the misstatement was accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language.34 As a result, courts often subject these statements to more exacting
scrutiny than other general allegations of misleading statements or omissions.35

(9th Cir. 1999). Under this higher pleading standard, the court rejected allegations based on motive and
opportunity and on recklessness. Id. Instead, to meet its new pleading standard for scienter, plaintiffs had
to plead, “at a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious
recklessness.” Id.
31
See Reform Act, 21E.
32
See, e.g., Kaufman v. Trump’s Castle Funding, 7 F.3d 357 (3rd Cir. 1993) (explicating and applying
“bespeaks caution” doctrine).
33
Reform Act Section 21E(c)(1)(B).
34
Id.
35
See Hockey v. Medheker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
9
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In adopting these reforms, Congress was attempting to reduce the liability
exposure of issuers, accountants, and investment bankers by making securities fraud
cases more difficult to litigate. Operationally, the PSLRA’s principal barrier is making
complaints more difficult to plead. The success of any reform to the litigation process,
however, will depend both on the work of the courts in implementing those reforms and
the responses of attorneys to those reforms. In the next part, we develop our hypotheses
regarding the effect of the PSLRA on the litigation and resolution of securities fraud class
actions.

III.

HYPOTHESES
In this part of the article, we develop a series of hypotheses concerning the

resolution of motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. We sort our hypotheses
into three categories. The objective of our first set of hypotheses is to determine whether
factors commonly included in securities fraud complaints correlate with the outcomes of
motions to dismiss those complaints, and, by inference, whether these factors influence
judges who must decide these motions. How well do plaintiffs’ attorneys tailor their
complaints to judges’ expectations? The objective of our second set of hypotheses is to
determine whether variations in the applicable legal standard lead to different outcomes.
Thus, the first two sets of hypotheses attempt to capture the impact of the heightened
pleading standard and the heightened liability standard for forward-looking statements on
litigation. Our third set of hypotheses focuses on whether the identity of the attorney
bringing the claims has an effect on the outcome.

A.

Type of Allegations

10
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As discussed above, Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the PSLRA was to
discourage weak or frivolous securities fraud suits. The “strong inference” pleading
requirement discussed above is the key mechanism Congress deployed. Earlier work
studying the effects of the PSLRA has found that plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to
satisfy this requirement by alleging that defendants have violated accounting principles.36
A typical allegation states that the firm and its managers ignored generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), provided numbers not supported by those
principles and, thereby, intentionally misled the investing public. This type of allegation
provides an intuitive basis from which to infer scienter. Rules, after all, are meant to be
followed; if they are not, a court could conclude that the defendants were knowingly
making misleading statements about the firms’ financial situation.
Courts may draw stronger inferences from alleged violations of GAAP if the
firm’s auditors or the SEC have required it to restate its revenues. Allegations that the
defendants inflated reported revenues may provide particularly salient evidence of
scienter, implying that the defendants wanted the company’s prospects to look better than
they actually were. The strength of these allegations is likely to vary with the evidence
that accounting principles have been violated. Restatements arguably offer particularly
tangible evidence to judges of a misstatement by the company. A restatement will only
be required if it is concluded that prior financial statements were materially misleading,
thus satisfying a central element for a 10b-5 claim. An allegation of an accounting
violation without an accompanying restatement may provide a weaker inference.
Similarly, allegations that defendants have violated accounting principles other than
36

PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000 Securities Litigation Study, www.10b5.com. (2000); see also Robert B.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Reflections on Federalism: Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance, 54
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revenue recognition may provide a slightly weaker basis for inferring fraudulent intent.
This analysis suggests a continuum of accounting allegations. Accordingly, we test three
separate hypotheses involving accounting violations:
H1:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the firm has
restated revenues.

H2:

Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the
firm has misled investors in recognizing revenues.

H3:

Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of
violations of GAAP other than revenue recognition.
Post-PSLRA complaints contain other types of common allegations, though we

believe the courts may perceive those allegations to be weaker than accounting
allegations.

For example, the increased prevalence of option-based compensation

schemes in recent years has made it much easier to allege claims using insider trading as
the motive from which scienter can be inferred. Moreover, the trades of officers and
directors are publicly available, and therefore readily included in complaints.

Such

claims have in fact increased.37 The theory behind these claims is that options, and stock
ownership in general, may provide an incentive for management to temporarily inflate
stock prices in order to liquidate their holdings. But stock and option compensation has
been so prevalent, it is also likely that there are few cases in which insider trading cannot
be alleged. As a result, if plaintiffs do not exercise restraint in making such allegations,
courts may discount claims relying on insider trading as an indicator of scienter -- despite
the intuitive plausibility of such conduct as a motive for fraud. Indeed, prior work

Vand. L. Rev. 101 (2003) (analyzing key allegations in complaints filed in Second and Ninth Circuits).
37
See Sale, Judging Heuristics, supra note __ (collecting and analyzing opinions discussing insider trading
allegations).
12
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suggests that courts are highly skeptical of such allegations38 and that the allegations are
uncorrelated with complaints surviving a motion to dismiss.39 Accordingly, our fourth
hypothesis is that:
H4:

Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints based on insider trading.
Plaintiffs can also satisfy the scienter requirement with other allegations of motive

to commit fraud.40 An offering of securities by the corporate defendant, either in the
form of a public or private offering or a merger in which stock is used as the
consideration, is a commonly pleaded motive for fraud. For example, the plaintiffs might
allege that the defendants made a misstatement to keep the stock price high in order to
pursue or complete a strategic combination, or that the defendants made a misstatement
in order to prime the market for their offering. Our fifth and sixth hypotheses are that:
H5:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer has offered
securities.

H6:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer is negotiating a
merger or has one pending.

B.

Legal Standards
Differences in the substantive law that judges apply to the complaints may also

affect the likelihood of dismissal. Prior to the PSLRA, plaintiffs based many claims on
assertions that companies had released misleading financial projections or other forward38

See Sale, Judging Heuristics, supra note __ (showing increased rejection of insider trading claims and
developing heuristics court deploy in dismissal).
39
Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? Class Actions under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Working paper, September 2002) (finding no association
between measure of abnormal insider trading and insider trading allegations).
40
This is true in most circuits, including the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2nd
Cir.), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000). The Ninth Circuit, however, purports to reject allegations of
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looking statements.41 As discussed above, the PSLRA raised the pleading requirement
for all allegations, but the statutory safe harbor raises the bar farther still to plead and
prove claims based on forward-looking statements.42 As a consequence, courts may be
particularly reluctant to allow allegations based on forward-looking statements to survive
a motion to dismiss, leading to our seventh hypothesis:
H7:

Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints based on forward-looking
statements.
The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (which apply only to

offerings of securities) differ substantially from Section 10(b) the Exchange Act (which
applies to fraud in connection with any purchase or sale of securities). In particular,
Section 11 of the Securities Act provides for strict liability for corporate issuers who have
made a material misstatement in a registration statement.43 Section 12(a)(2) provides a
negligence claim for misstatements in a prospectus.44 Although plaintiffs must meet
other hurdles to succeed with these claims,45 the PSLRA’s increased pleading standard
for claims based on a particular state of mind was included only in the amendments to the
Exchange Act, not the Securities Act.46 Nonetheless, some courts have held that when
these Securities Act claims are pleaded in the same complaint with a 10b-5 claim, the
entire complaint “sounds in fraud” and is subject to the heightened pleading standard. As
a result, those courts have dismissed the strict liability and negligence claims along with

scienter based on “motive and opportunity.” See In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970
(1999).
41
Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick and Katherine Schipper, Shareholder Litigation and Corporate
Disclosures, 32 Journal of Accounting Research 137 (1994).
42
Securities Act § 27A; Exchange Act §21E.
43
15 U.S.C. §77k.
44
15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2).
45
For a full explication of these claims and their litigation, see Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a
Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Washington Law Review 429 (2000).
46
Compare ___ with ___.
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the 10b-5 claim.47 Others have, however, refused to adopt this approach, holding that
because the 1933 Act Claims do not require scienter, they are not subject to a heightened
pleading standard and should be allowed to proceed. Accordingly, our eighth hypothesis
lacks a predicted direction:
H8:

Courts are [not] less likely to dismiss complaints that include claims brought
under the Securities Act of 1933.

C.

Identity of Counsel
Another factor that may influence outcomes on motions to dismiss is the identity

of class counsel. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach is by far the largest law firm
specializing in securities fraud class actions, appearing as counsel in the majority of those
suits. Bill Lerach, one of the firm’s best-known partners, gained notoriety during the
PSLRA debates, with his boast (repeatedly cited by proponents of reform): “I have the
greatest practice in the world. I have no clients.” This publicity is not likely to raise
one’s reputation with judges. Consequently, judges familiar with the reputation of the
Milberg Weiss firm may be skeptical of the claims that it brings, making complaints filed
by that firm particularly susceptible to dismissal.
On the other hand, Milberg Weiss does more securities litigation than any other
plaintiffs’ firm. Its economies of scale may make it the firm best suited to adapt its
pleadings and conform to or even anticipate shifts in the case law.48 It may also have
greater resources to invest in pre-complaint investigation, which might enhance its ability
to plead with particularity. Consequently, its complaints may be more likely to survive
dismissal. We therefore do not have a predicted direction for our ninth hypothesis:
47

See, e.g.

(2nd Cir. 2003).
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H9:

Courts are more/less likely to dismiss claims brought by Milberg Weiss.

IV.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We turn now to our empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in Part III. We

begin by describing our sample selection. We also present descriptive statistics for the
variables that that we use to capture the effect of different factors on litigation outcomes.
We then discuss the results of our regression analyses.

A.

Sample selection and descriptive statistics.
Our sample consists of decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits ruling on

motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. Using Lexis and Westlaw searches, as
well as various reporters and websites, we collected every available decision (published
or unpublished) by both district and appellate courts applying the PSLRA to a motion to
dismiss from the beginning of 1996 through the end of 2001. This sample comes close to
reflecting the entire population for these two circuits, excluding only orders not captured
in any of these media. Our searches yielded 213 total decisions from these circuits. We
then excluded all but the last available decision in the sample for each lawsuit, leaving
155 decisions; 65 of these are from the Second Circuit and 90 are from the Ninth.
We chose these two circuits for our study because they are the leading circuits for
the filing of securities class actions.

In addition, they are generally recognized as

representing two ends of the pleading spectrum on securities claims. As discussed above,
the courts have adopted very different approaches to interpreting and applying the
pleading provisions of the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the most stringent
48

See Elliot J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 10-16 (2001) (analyzing the
“creative drafting” of Milberg Weiss’s Silicon Graphics complaint); id. at 27-44 (analyzing additional
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interpretation of that provision in its Silicon Graphics decision, requiring plaintiffs to
plead that defendants were “deliberately reckless” in making the misstatements alleged to
be fraudulent.49 Not surprisingly, courts adopting higher standards appear somewhat
more likely to dismiss claims.50

In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s percentage of all

securities class action filings has declined subsequent to that decision, suggesting
plaintiffs’ lawyers prefer to litigate elsewhere.51 Focusing on these two circuits allows us
look more carefully at how the different standards applied in the two circuits affect
different kinds of allegations.
We collected the data for each of the variables from the opinions resolving the
motions to dismiss or the complaints themselves. We restrict our study to these data
sources because the purpose of our analysis is to study the judicial implementation of the
PSLRA and the factors that influence those judicial decisions. Thus, our study focuses
on the cases as presented to the judge. Our variables abstract from the picture presented
to the judges, however, in that they do not capture the relative strength of the allegations
as they are found in the complaints.

Allegations of insider trading may vary in

credibility, for example, depending on whether the insider trading alleged is unusual in
amount or timing.52 This simplification is necessary to make data collection tractable,
but it excludes some data that could affect our results.

complaints by Milberg Weiss).
49
In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
50
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 629 (2002). Stock prices in the high
tech sector rose after the Silicon Graphics decision, possibly indicating that investors believed that the
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It is also important to note that the revenue recognition variables are coded
according to the most serious allegation contained in the complaint. So a complaint that
includes an allegation the firm restated its revenues will be coded as 0 for the other
revenue recognition category, even if the complaint includes revenue recognition
allegations other than the restatement. By contrast, if a complaint contains an allegation
that a company improperly recognized revenues as well as violating other accounting
principles, it is coded as a 1 for both accounting categories. With these caveats in mind,
the variables are defined as follows:
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Variable
Dismissed

Definition

Predicted
Direction

Coded as 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with or
without prejudice, and 0 if any of the allegations are not
dismissed.

RestateRevRec Coded as 1 if complaint alleges that the firm restated
prior revenues, 0 otherwise.
RevRec

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges that the firm
deceptively recognized revenues, but without a
restatement, 0 otherwise.

?

OtherGAAP

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges violations of
generally accepted accounting principles other than
revenue recognition, 0 otherwise.

?

InsTrade

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges insider trading, 0
otherwise.

+

Offering

Coded as 1 if the complaints alleges that the company
offered securities (debt or equity), 0 otherwise.

Merger

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges that the company
merged or was contemplating a merger, 0 otherwise.

FwdLooking

Coded as 1 if complaint includes an allegation of a false
forward-looking statement, 0 otherwise.

+

’33 Act

Coded as 1 if complaint includes a claim for violations of
Sections 11 or 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 0
otherwise.

?

Milberg

Coded as 1 if Milberg Weiss is class counsel, 0
otherwise.

?

Circuit

Coded as 1 for the Ninth Circuit, 0 for Second Circuit.

+

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as well as both
circuits. Table 1 also presents tests for differences between the means for our two
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subsamples.

Because all of the variables are binary, the reported means reflect

percentages for the samples.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Both (N = 155)
2nd Cir. (N = 65)
Variable
Mean
Mean
Dismissed
0.369
0.510
RestateRevRec
0.155
0.169
RevRec
0.185
0.210
OtherGAAP
0.354
0.323
InsTrade
0.385
0.497
Offering
0.431
0.284
Merger
0.338
0.342
FwdLooking
0.308
0.419
33 Act
0.277
0.174
Milberg
0.446
0.587
Circuit
0.581
Significant differences (at the 1% level) are in bold.

9th Cir. (N = 90)
Mean
0.611
0.144
0.244
0.300
0.578
0.178
0.344
0.500
0.100
0.689

Test of Differences
P-value
0.001
0.338
0.189
0.241
0.009
<0.001
0.469
0.008
0.002
0.001

The most striking difference in the table is the great discrepancy in percentage of
motions granted. The Second Circuit courts granted 37% of motions to dismiss, and the
Ninth Circuit courts granted 61%. The difference is is strongly significant. This statistic
provides some support for the view that the Ninth Circuit is a tougher forum in which to
bring to securities fraud class actions. This raw measure does not control, however for
the content of complaints. It is possible (although not readily explainable) that plaintiffs’
lawyers bring systematically weaker claims in the Ninth Circuit.
Consistent with the results of prior work, we find that accounting violations are
common allegations in the complaints in our sample. Revenue recognition allegations
appear in 37% of the complaints, and allegations of violations of other accounting
principles appear in nearly a third. There is no statistically significant difference between
the two circuits for any of the accounting allegation variables. Allegations of insider
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trading, by contrast, are significantly more likely to appear in Ninth Circuit complaints,
likely reflecting the importance of options as a form of compensation in the high tech
sector. Offering appears significantly more often in Second Circuit complaints, reflecting
New York’s preeminence as an investment banking center. Merger appears in about a
third of the complaints in each circuit. Forward-looking statements are more likely to be
alleged in Ninth Circuit complaints, and the Milberg firm is more prominently
represented in that circuit, appearing in more than two-thirds of the cases there.53 The
Second Circuit has a significantly higher percentage of ’33 Act claims.

B.

Regression results
We now turn to the results of our multivariate regressions. We use logistic

regression analysis with the outcome of the motion to dismiss as our dependent variable.
The outcome is coded 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with or without prejudice,
and 0 if any of the allegations are not dismissed. Consequently, positive regression
coefficients are correlated with dismissal and negative coefficients correlate with motions
that are denied. The regression results are reported in Table 2.

53

Although Milberg Weiss has multiple offices, Bill Lerach heads the firm’s San Diego office.
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Table 2
Regression Results

Variable
Intercept

Prediction
?

RestateRevRec
RevRec
OtherGAAP
InsTrade
Offering
Merger
FwdLooking
33 Act
Milberg
Circuit

–
?
?
+
–
–
+
?

Both
Coeff. p-value
0.352
0.393

Both
Coeff. p-value

2nd Circuit
Coeff. p-value
0.290 0.626

9th Circuit
Coeff. p-value
0.187
0.733

0.362

0.527

1.968

0.106

0.416

0.580

0.141

0.764

1.439

0.132

0.677

0.291

0.812

0.040

1.521

0.040

0.663

0.214

0.945

0.022

1.439

0.078

1.232

0.025

0.092

0.836

0.224

0.764

0.303

0.642

0.363

0.333

0.390

0.549

0.572

0.261

0.744

0.073

-2.176

0.015

0.284

0.594

?

0.637
0.043

0.216
0.912

0.632
1.351

0.444
0.071

1.498
0.544

0.070
0.325

+

0.892

0.021

0.477

0.556

CirRestateRevRec

2.384

0.096

CirRevRec

2.116

0.066

CirOtherGAAP

0.857

0.348

CirInsTrade

0.206

0.834

CirOffer

0.527

0.595

CirMerger

0.182

0.826

CirFwdLooking

1.892

0.068

Cir33Act

2.131

0.069

CirMilberg

1.895

0.042

2

0.170
155

Pseudo R
0.106
N
155
Significant coefficients (at the 10% level) are in bold.

0.182
65

0.100
90

Our first regression uses the entire sample and includes Circuit as an independent
variable. We find a positive coefficient on this variable, significant at the 5% level.
These results are consistent with the view that courts in the Ninth Circuit are more likely
to dismiss claims.

This correlation between a tougher standard and an increased

likelihood of dismissal suggests that the legal standard does influence outcomes.
We caution, however, against reading too much into the positive coefficient for
Circuit. If the strength of the allegations in the complaints varies systematically between
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the two circuits, then it is possible that the Ninth Circuit is not more demanding.

The

significant coefficient for Circuit does imply, however, that the two circuits may differ in
how they treat different types of allegations.54
Accordingly, we ran additional regressions using the decisions from each of the
circuits as our subsamples in order to control for the possibility that there were structural
differences between the two circuits. In order to assess which variables were affected by
the difference between the two circuits, we also ran an additional regression with the
entire sample adding interaction variables to capture the interaction between our
independent variables and the circuit.
1.

Type of allegation

Of the accounting variables, RestRevRec and RevRec have the predicted negative
sign only in the Second Circuit.

These results indicate that allegations of revenue

recognition in conjunction with a restatement as well as other allegations of revenue
recognition correlate with surviving a motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit, but not in
the Ninth. The two revenue recognition variables do approach statistical significance at
the 10% level. These coefficients might prove to be significant with a larger sample size.
The only accounting variable that reaches statistical significance is OtherGAAP. As a
result, we conclude that revenue recognition, revenue recognition with a restatement, and
OtherGAAP allegations make dismissal less likely in the Second Circuit.
In the Ninth Circuit, the accounting allegations are all insignificant. Moreover,
our interaction variables are positive and significant at the 10% level for the two revenue

54

Our results may understate the magnitude of this effect because many of our district court opinions were
decided before the Ninth Circuit adopted its stringent standard in Silicon Graphics in July, 1999, although
the general trend was established in the district courts before that decision. Our sample is therefore
potentially biased against a finding of statistical significance.
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recognition variables. These results suggest that the Ninth Circuit is more skeptical of
such allegations than the Second Circuit and is likely to grant a motion to dismiss even
when these allegations are present.
The circuits are in accord, however, in their treatment of cases alleging trades by
insiders. We find positive and significant (at the 10% level for the Second Circuit, the
5% level for the Ninth Circuit) coefficients for InsTrade. These coefficients support
Hypothesis 4’s contention that courts are skeptical of the rather noisy signal provided by
such trades.

Recall that these trades are pleaded in many complaints and that the

presence of options as a form of pay is likely to increase trades by insiders, and, thereby,
the possibility of including them in pleadings.
Our other variables intended to capture motive to engage in fraud, Offering and
Merger, are consistently insignificant. We can conclude little from this result. It is
possible that motive-based allegations like offerings, mergers, and trades are not
particularly persuasive to the courts. Or, over time, with a much larger sample size, we
might find a pattern.
2. Legal Standards
The coefficient on the FwdLooking variable is significant in the Second Circuit
and the combined sample, but with a negative coefficient meaning that the invariable
relates inversely to dismissal. Thus, the sign on the coefficient is the opposite of the
direction that we predicted with Hypothesis 7.55 Rather than applying a very rigorous
standard to such allegations and rejecting them, the Second Circuit appears to treat
forward looking statements in a less defendant-friendly manner than we expected.
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What explains this anomaly? There are at least two possibilities. The first theory
is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the stringent standard for forward-looking statements in
mind, are selective in choosing forecasts and predictions upon which to base suits. When
they allege such statements, they have good information to support their contentions.
The second theory is that judges are skeptical of the high barrier represented by the
PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements, and are therefore reluctant to
enforce the safe harbor as vigorously as Congress might have anticipated. Although we
cannot resolve which theory better explains this result, we consider the second less likely.
After all, the pre-PSLRA “bespeaks caution” doctrine was judge made and created
without any legislative prodding. The PSLRA’s safe harbor is simply an additional step
in the development of that doctrine.
Our last variable relating to the effect of legal standards on outcomes is ’33 Act.
This coefficient is significant (at the 10% level) with the predicted negative, nondismissal, sign in the Ninth Circuit, but is insignificant in the Second Circuit (with a
positive sign), despite the greater prevalence of such claims in that circuit. Thus, courts
within the Ninth Circuit are less likely to dismiss ‘33 Act claims than their Second
Circuit counterparts. In our regressions for the combined sample, the coefficient for the
interaction variable for Circuit and ’33 Act is significant and negative, further supporting
the proposition that the Ninth Circuit is more hospitable to such claims. We conclude
that our findings support the hypothesis that Securities Act claims are more likely to be
treated as non-fraud claims in the Ninth Circuit.

55

The Ninth Circuit coefficient for this variable is insignificant. We note, however, that the interaction
variable for this coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting the Ninth Circuit is more skeptical of
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3. Identity of the Parties and Counsel
Our final variable, Milberg, has a negative but insignificant coefficient in the
Ninth Circuit, but a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficient in
the Second Circuit. Thus, these results indicate a correlation between dismissal and the
presence of the Milberg firm in the Second Circuit, but lack sufficient information for
making predictions about the Ninth Circuit. The interaction variable for Circuit and
Milberg is negative and significant (at the 10% level), suggesting either that Second
Circuit courts treat the firm’s complaints with greater skepticism or the firm brings
weaker complaints in that circuit.

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The decision to file a lawsuit and the drafting of the complaint is an art, not a

science. The landscape of securities fraud litigation changed dramatically in 1995 when
Congress passed the PSLRA. That legislation overhauled many of the procedural and
pleading aspects of securities fraud class actions, leaving the standards for making such
claims highly uncertain. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, our findings suggest that
social science may be able to offer insights to class action attorneys who are making
filing decisions. Our study of motion to dismiss opinions since the passage of the
PSLRA also suggests that the reforms have had an important impact on certain types of
allegations commonly found in securities fraud complaints.
The first key reform is the heightened pleading standard. Although we do not
take a position here on which circuit, the Second or the Ninth, has adopted the “correct”
standard, the results of our regression analysis suggests that the standard may make a

such allegations.
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difference in outcomes. The Ninth Circuit declared its intent to adopt a standard more
stringent than the Second Circuit’s, and plaintiffs are now more likely to see their cases
dismissed in that circuit.
But the actual knowledge standard required for forward-looking statements does
not appear as formidable in the courts as it does in the statute books. Most complaints
raising such claims survive. We speculate that this may be due to increasingly specific
pleading by the plaintiffs, but our statistical analysis does not permit us to say more. It is
also possible that judges are skeptical of the fact that the actual knowledge requirement
applies to pleadings as well as at trial.
One of the most interesting aspects of our study is how the heightened pleading
standard plays out with respect to specific types of allegations. The Second Circuit
appears to find allegations of accounting violations more persuasive than does the Ninth
Circuit. It is possible, however, that complaints brought in the Second Circuit have
stronger evidence of accounting wrongdoing.
The motive-based allegations find a mixed response in the courts. Trades by
insiders are unpersuasive in both circuits, and the merger and offering coefficients are
consistently insignificant. Finally, the Milberg Weiss firm faces more of a struggle in
courts within the Second Circuit than in the Ninth. The difference in the firm’s results
between the two circuits may be driven by intra-firm differences as much as variations in
approach by the courts.
In conclusion, our findings make clear that the law does matter. To date, the most
significant obstacle to class actions is the heightened pleading standard, rather than the
special forward-looking statement standard.
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possibilities for future study. The strongest regression results are those resulting from the
application of the heightened pleading standard to allegations intended to show
knowledge or motive. Plaintiffs with accounting allegations are more likely to survive a
motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit; the Ninth Circuit appears more skeptical of such
claims. We would hypothesize that in the wake of Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia and other
accounting scandals, those allegations will continue to carry weight with the courts, and
that attitudes in the Ninth Circuit courts may shift. And given the media and academic
focus on the role options appeared to play in today’s corporate governance scandals, it
will be interesting to see whether the courts will reconsider their apparently hostile
attitude toward claims alleging trades by insiders as a basis for scienter. Over time, of
course, plaintiffs’ lawyers may also refine their use of such allegations to mirror more
closely judicial doctrine. Thus, the cases decided in the next few years may reveal an
interesting shift in the courts’ perspectives on what counts as fraud.
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